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AN AMERICAN VISION: THE RIGHT TO SHELTER
S. Lynn Martinez*
Introduction
Like shoes on our feet and food on our table, most of us take our housing for
granted. Personal views of "home" can form different images, ranging from warm
and safe surroundings to violent and frightening prison-like environments. These
visions, however, usually include a roof over our heads. For many, on the other
hand, like the approximately 3 million Americans nationwide we call the
homeless,' housing is an unrealized dream.
Who are the homeless? They can no longer be classified as the drunken bum
who has "chosen" a life on the streets, and therefore, justifiably ignored by society.
They are people fighting to survive. They attempt to find shelter by sharing single
family units with one or more families,2 or creating makeshift dwellings from a va-
riety of available materials, such as cardboard boxes or plastic bags.
The homeless population is diverse, varying in age, gender, and color. Ac-
cording to the 1984 Housing and Urban Development (HUD) national study, ap-
proximately one-third of the homeless are women and their children.' Currently,
the average age is in the mid-thirties and only a small percentage of the homeless
are over 60. In contrast to their representation in the general community, a large
ratio of the homeless are people of color. Although the average income of a home-
less person is $100 per month, more than one in five are completely destitute.4 The
homeless receive food from soup kitchens or from garbage cans and they find shel-
ter in public parks, campgrounds, city doorways, on a friend's couch or in tempo-
rary "homeless" shelters.
Every state in our nation has a statute "requiring counties to 'relieve and sup-
port' the indigent."' But what constitutes relief and support? Unquestionably, the
* S. Lynn Martinez is a May 1992 graduate of the University of California, Davis School of Law. After
Graduation she will be working with Solano County Legal Assistance in Vallejo, California where she
hopes to practice law as it relates to the poor and the very poor. She wishes to acknowledge Dr. Panlo
Dau and Professor Kevin Johnson for their input and support in the writing of this article.
1 Robert C. Coates, LegalRights ofHomeless Americans, 24 U.S.F.L. Rsv. 297,298 (Winter 1990). This
figure is often challenged. Peter H. Rossi, The Family, Welfare and Homelessness, 4No'r DAm J.L. Er-
ics & Pun. PoL'y 281,285 (1989) ("Best estimates range around 500,000, with a range of 100,000"). Jona-
than Kozol, Rachel And Her Children, 9 (1988) (National Coalition for the Homeless report 3 to 4
million). Cad F. Horowitz, LA. DAILY JouRNAL, April 4, 1990, at 6 (Advocates for the homeless seriously
inflate estimates).
2 See MARIO M CUOMO, NaEvERAAIN: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNOR's ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON
THIuHOMELESS 39 (1983). The Census Bureau's annual Survey of Housing found that in 1982, the number
of households with two or more related families sharing space jumped from 1.2 million units to 1.9 mil-
lion units - an increase of 58%. Kim Hopper, The Ordeal of Shelter: Continuities and Discontinuities in
thePublic Response to Homelessness, 4NoTnDAm J.L.Eimcs & Put.PL'Y 301, 317 (1989). "The scale
of 'doubled- up' families in public housing alone in New York City outnumbers those who are officially
homeless by 20 to 1.'
' Kim Hopper and Jill Hamberg, The Making of America's Homeless: From Skid Row to New Poor,
1945-1984 in CRrTicALP.SPEcnvs ON HousiN 30 (1986). This is probably underestimated because the
study "explicitly excluded families 'vouchered' into hotels and motels on an emergency basis."
4 Rossi, supra note 1, at 283.
5 Coates, supra note 1, at 305.
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basic needs of human survival consist of food, clothing and shelter. These needs,
however, are not always met by our local systems. The very poor, finding clothing
and food to be the least expensive of their basic needs, "choose" to go without per-
manent shelter in order to survive." Therefore, the temporary shelter has become
the home of today's very poor.
Notwithstanding the issue of whether a right to housing exists, a constitutional
right to shelter - to temporary emergency shelter - needs to be recognized in or-
der to begin to repair the dilemma of the homeless. Naturally, the right to tempo-
rary shelter is a band-aid on an open sore. However, once established, this reform
may lead to another right which should have existed all along: the right to clean
and safe, affordable and habitable permanent housing.
This article focuses on the ingredients that are establishing the right to shelter.
Part I outlines the history of homelessness, leading up to the reasons that homeless-
ness exists as an epidemic as we enter the last decade of the twentieth century (Part
II.) Part III summarizes the nationwide litigation efforts in which advocates for the
homeless are slowly establishing that a fundamental right to shelter exists. In Part
IV, this article profiles the frustrating, but generally successful, litigation process in
California that is slowly defining statutory entitlements for the poor and is building
the framework in which to house the right to shelter.
History.
The English legislature attempted to control vagrancy by imposing penalties as
early as 1388. The law required people with transitory lifestyles to be imprisoned
unless they carried papers which authorized them to travel. Furthermore, people
were only allowed to give money or shelter to licensed beggars, identified by stat-
ute as the aged, the poor and the disabled.7
Later, the legislature licensed no one to beg and in reaction to the steady in-
crease in homelessness, Edward VI ordained an act in 1547 which provided for "all
persons loitering, wandering and not seeking work" to be branded with a 'V' on his
breast and made a slave of his captor (or returned to his home town and made a
slave of his community) for the following two years. If he refused enslavement or
escaped, he was branded with an 'S' onf his cheek and following further refusal, he
was sentenced to death.'
The United States did not escape England's vagrancy problems. The begin-
ning of the 17th century marked the arrival of the "first boatload of England's
homeless, dependent children."' Two centuries later, New York City opened its
first soup kitchen and its earliest homeless shelter." Throughout our history, home-
lessness has continued to be a volatile problem. The numbers of people without
homes increased with the flow of European immigration, the aftermath of the Civil
War, the escalation of unemployment (up to 40%) following Black September in
1873" and during the Depression when emergency shelters and squatter camps
were filled with several hundred thousand people without homes.'
6 Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Homelessness, 4NOTRaDAMBJ.L. ETHICS&PUB. POL'y 223 (1987).
7 SAMUELE. WALIuAC, SKID RowASAWAY OFLIFE 5 (1965).
Id. at5-6.
'Id. at 4.
'Id. at 11.
" Id. at 14-15.
12 See Coates, supra note 1, at 281. See also JOHN S-MniNBc, THHARvasr GYPSIES: ON TH ROAD TO H
GRA.Es oF WRAT (1936).
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Homelessness, however, declined severely in the postwar period as housing
conditions, on the average, improved. The homeless that did exist were "almost
exclusively... older white men... [many] of whom suffered from chronic ail-
ments, especially alcoholism."13 These people were relegated to Skid Row where
they were housed in missions and flophouses, 4 or single room hotels.5
Today, the homeless who inhabit our streets differ from their earlier counter-
parts on Skid Row in that residents of Skid Row had access to some shelter, albeit
inadequate. Additionally, there were "virtually no women or families on Skid
Row."' 6 Although it is often claimed that substance abuse leads to homelessness,
alcoholism and drug addiction is not a major cause for the increase in today's
homeless. 17 Rather, it is suggested that much of the alcohol and drug abuse en-
countered by the homeless is aproduct of their situation. It provides the means for
escaping their environment and elevating their lowered self esteem.
The Creation of Today's Homeless.
There are many reasons why the number of people without homes has esca-
lated in our nation today. They include a shortage of affordable housing, deinstitu-
tionalization, rising unemployment, inadequate government benefits and the rise in
divorce, causing the breakdown in families. Because of these differences, it is dif-
ficult to find solutions for one aspect of the problem without ignoring another facet
of the dilemma.
Shortage ofAffordable Housing
Displacement of the poor from their homes results from demolition, gentrifica-
tion, fire, eviction, rent increases, and changing urban land use laws. For the low-
rent and subsidized housing units that still remain, long waiting lists exist. The
large numbers of the single-room occupancy (SRO) hotels which provided shelter
for the residents of Skid Row have been demolished or refurbished into senior citi-
zen units, condominiums or other uses."
Urban renewal is also depleting housing in downtown areas of American cities.
Middle income families, pushed out of the traditional first time homeowner market,
are either "out-bidding" lower income families for rentals or buying and renovating
houses located in deteriorated urban areas and thus, displacing the poorer resi-
dents.' Moreover, new houses are not being built fast enough to replenish the sup-
ply of needed housing. In 1979, there were 200,000 publicly subsidized housing
units being built or renovated. Budget cuts reduced this figure to 55,000 in 1983
and one year later, to 30,000.0 Between fiscal years 1981 and 1985, low income
housing assistance funds were cut from $31 billion to $10 billion'
The 1980's also saw a drastic rent increase while tenant's income increased at a
slower rate. According to Hopper, by 1980, "seven million households, mostly low
income renters, were paying more than 50 percent of their incomes for housing.
13 See Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 3, at 16.
14 See Rossi, supra note 1, at 282.
15 See WALAcE, supra note 7, at 34.
16 See Rossi, supra note 4, at 283.
See Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 3, at 33.
"See Rossi, supra note 1.
"See generally Hopper and Hamberg, supra note 3.
20 See Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 3, at 30.
21 May E Hombs, Social Recognition of the Homeless: Policies ofIndifference, 31 WAS.UJ.URB.&
Co~rn-ma. L. 143,144 (Winter 1987).
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For the very poor, the 2.7 million renter households with incomes below $3,000,
the situation became catastrophic: half were paying over 72 percent of their incom-
es for rent, leaving $71 a month for all other needs."'
Exclusionary zoning is also a major hurdle confronting the establishment of
affordable housing and temporary shelters. Since zoning is a police power func-
tion and usually considered constitutional, zoning ordinances are usually not over-
turned by the courts unless they are considered adverse to the general welfare of its
citizens. Consequently, zoning usually serves to preserve the wealthier landown-
er's rights while ignoring the earnest need for low-income housing and emergency
shelter for the homeless.'
Deinstitutionalization
Although far more noticeable because of their appearance, the severe and per-
manently mentally disabled make up only between 25% and 50% of the homeless
population.2' Their presence on the street is due largely to the deinstitutionalization
movement of the 1960's.
Originally founded on profoundly well-meaning intentions, the objective of the
movement was to integrate the mentally ill into the community in order to afford
them a more complete and human life. The reduction of widespread use of me-
dication coupled with the abatement of the negative effects of long-term
institutionalization proved encouraging. Furthermore, the movement resulted in
tremendous monetary savings when the population of mental hospitals was reduced
from 559,000 in 1956 to only 133,550 in 1980.25
Despite the failure for our communities to absorb and care for the mentally ill,
we have not learned from our mistakes. 26 According to the New York Times, "Dis-
charge to the municipal shelter system will henceforth be considered an 'appropri-
ate' aftercare placement for psychiatric patients in municipal hospitals."
27
Unemployment
In addition to incomes failing to adjust to the rising inflation of the 1970's, the
changing labor force significantly influenced the increase in unemployment. Be-
tween 1960 and 1980, the number of the labor force employed in manufacturing
fell 2 0%,' and each year, two million jobs in steel, textiles and other industries
continue to disappear.2 Hopper and Hamberg'describe the occurrence of a "domi-
no effect" in which the surplus of skilled, experienced workers begin taking jobs in
low wage services, such as "pushing brooms in McDonalds." This results in the
displacement of the unskilled worker who would normally be able to occupy these
job positions."
22 See Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 3, at 21.
" See generally Katherine C. Devers and I. Gardner West, Exclusionary Zoning and Its Effect on Housing
Opportunitiesfor the Homeless, 4 Nom DAhm J.L ETmics & Pun. Po'Y 349.
' H. Richard Lamb, Voluntary Treatmentfor the Homeless Mentally 171, 4 Nomm DAME J.L EmCis & Pul.
PoL'Y 250.
25 See Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 3, at 23-24.
2 See Kim Hopper, The Ordeal of Shelter: Continuities and Discontinuities in the Public Response to
Homelessness, 4 NoTwDAmBJ.L.Eimcs&PuB. PoL'y 301,321 (1989).
z N.Y. T.bm, March 6,1989, at A16.
See Hopper&Hamberg, supra note 3, at 18.
29 See Kozol, supra note 1, at 13.
" See Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 3, at 18.
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The displacement of industrial workers is not the only factor causing the in-
crease in homelessness. As jobs became scarce, the unemployment rates affecting
people of color increased, accounting for their growing numbers in the homeless
population. Minorities, especially young minority men, face unemployment rates
estimated at three times higher than their white counterparts. Since 1975, these un-
employment figures have at times reached highs of 40%."'
Inadequate Benefits
In 1980, 11 million households lived under the poverty level. Forty two per-
cent of these households did not receive any government benefits, including living
or medical assistance, food stamps, school lunch programs or public housing. 2
Even with government benefits, it is difficult to survive and virtually impossi-
ble to find affordable housing. Families with children are eligible for Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC). Many states, however, do not make AFDC
payments to families where both parents are still in the home. 3 Furthermore,
AFDC benefits declined 30% in value by the mid-80's while the number of fami-
lies receiving AFDC continued to grow. Benefits for the elderly, on the other
hand, saw a 50% increase in value. This resulted in a severe reduction of people
over 65 falling below the poverty line."
Other benefits available include Unemployment Benefits, Supplemental Secu-
rity Income (SSI) and state-provided General Assistance (GA). Unemployment
benefits are limited in time and are based on previous employment. In most cases,
the poor must seek alternative help other than unemployment benefits. SSI is
available, if the beneficiary is aged, blind or disabled.
GA provides benefits for people without families. Because it is state-provided,
a number of states, especially in the sunbelt, opt not to make it available." Other
states limit the availability of GA benefits to only one or two months a year. Most
states use GA as the last resort, preferring to use federal subsidized programs if the
recipient can qualify. Although they vary in amounts, GA payments have also not
kept up with inflation and are insufficient to take care of all the human basic
needs.37
Finally, as in housing assistance, administration cuts have severely affected
benefits. Between 1981 and 1985, AFDC was cut by $4.8 billion, child nutrition
by $5.2 billion, and food stamps by $6.8 billion. Low-income energy assistance
was also cut by $700 million3
Divorce
Half of the marriages in the United States end in divorce; the divorce rate
doubled in the 1970's.39 Therefore, not only is there an immediate lack of housing
31 See Rossi, supra note 1, at 296.
n See Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 3, at 20.
" Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 3, at 20. See also Rossi, supra note 3, at 293 n.25. Some states have
enacted AFDC-UP (Unemployed Parent) which is available to families with both parents in the home.
34 See Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 1, at 292; and Rossi, supra note 3, at 20.
" See Rossi, supra note 1, at 292.
36 See Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 3, at 27.
37 See Rossi, supra note 1, at 293. In 1988, for example, General Assistance payments ranged from $212 a
month in Los Angeles to $154 a month in Chicago. The state of Texas did not extend any assistance.
33 See Kozol, supra note 1, at 163.
39 See Hopper & Hamberg, supra note 3, at 19.
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but there are twice as many people competing for the housing that is available. Be-
tween 1970 and 1984, female-headed households increased by 84% and the number
of children living with divorced mothers doubled in roughly the same time periodl
This has resulted in the "feminization of poverty," and by 1984, two out of every
three poor adults were women. At the same time, one out of every five children
lived below poverty level' Consequently, the fastest growing subgroup of the
homeless population are women with children, which is becoming more evident by
the presence of families in shelters and on the streets.42
Nationwide: The Right to Shelter.
A fundamental right to shelter does not exist under our federal constitution, nor
is there a common law right to shelter. Homeless advocates throughout the nation,
however, are using the litigation process to slowly convince our judicial system
that a right to temporary and permanent shelter does exist. A large proportion of
these litigation efforts are directed primarily toward public assistance and the wel-
fare of children. Other jurisdictions, such as New York, the District of Columbia
and California, also concentrate on defining vague statutory entitlements.
Statutorily Defining the Homeless
The imbroglio of the exploding homeless population has not gone unrecog-
nized by Congress. In early 1987, the legislative branch introduced The Homeless
Assistance Act of 1987 (also known as the "Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assis-
tance Act") as an emergency bill.4 While implicitly stating that shelter is consid-
ered a basic human need, the McKinney Bill does not, however, recognize a
fundamental right to permanent housing or whether the federal government has an
obligation to fulfill such a right. The McKinney Bill acknowledges only the im-
mediate needs of temporary shelter for the homeless but does not address the de-
mand "to provide sufficient permanent affordable housing to prevent homelessness
in the first place." (emphasis added)"M
In order to begin assessing a right to shelter, the nation should adopt a uniform
definition of "homelessness." Many of the versions embraced by the states do not
include families who are "doubled-up" or do not address homelessness as a long-
term condition. The Homeless Assistance Act defines the homeless person as an
individual who:
lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; and...
1) [whose] primary nighttime residence ... [is] a supervised publicly or
privately operated shelter designed to provide temporary living accom-
modations (including welfare hotels, congregate shelters, and transitional
housing for the mentally ill), or
2) an institution that provides a temporary residence for individuals in-
tended to be institutionalized, or
40 Patricia A. Sullivan and Shirley P. Damrasch, Homeless Women and Children in THE HoMLmSS IN CoN.
TEMPORARY Sociery 91 (1987).
41 Id. at 92.
' Patrick L Catty, Preventing Homelessness: Rent Control or RentAssistance?, 4 NoTRm DAME J.L Elmics
&PUB. PoL'Y 365, 383 (1989).
43 42 U.S.C. § 11301(a) (1989).
" See New FederalAssistance for the Homeless in HousnGLAw Buua= 82 (September/October 1987).
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3) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regu-
lar sleeping accommodation for human beings4 5
The definition embraced by Congress differs from the versions upheld by the
states that employ narrower definitions, such as the one adopted by the Governor's
Advisory Committee on the Homeless in Boston, Massachusetts:
[The homeless are] persons or families who, on one particular day or
night, have neither friends, family nor sufficient funds which will provide
for certain elementary resources they need to survive. (emphasis added)'
or, in California, the Homeless Relief Pilot Project defined a homeless person as:
an individual who lacks the financial resources, mental capacity, or com-
munity ties needed to provide for his or her own adequate shelter.
(emphasis added)47
Juxtaposed to the definition of a homeless person as adopted by Congress, the
states' definitions are extremely restrictive. They do not take into account, for ex-
ample, the abundance of families doubling up in single family units. Although
concededly sleeping with roofs over their heads, these families lack a place to call
their "own home," which is emotionally disturbing and depletes the self-esteem of
the family. Since doubled-family situations cannot last indefinitely, these families
are on the edge of literal homelessness.
Moreover, some statutory definitions do not acknowledge that shelter is a long-
term necessity. In Massachusetts, the issue of homelessness is addressed by the
homeless person on a daily basis. Shelter must be sought every day in order to be
homeless in the state. If they have a place to stay for a week, they are not consid-
ered, by definition of the statute, "homeless." The homeless, therefore, must spend
each day finding shelter for the night. Since most of their time is spent on this ele-
ment of survival, they do not have a chance to restructure their lives and pull them-
selves up.
Because so many Americans are likely to remain homeless under existing stat-
utory definitions, some researchers have recommended the adoption of model defi-
nitions, such as "anyone 'without an address which assures them of at least the
following thirty days' sleeping quarters which meet minimal health and safety stan-
dards. ,'
This suggested definition has not, as yet, been followed.
New York
In 1979, the first case concerning a right to shelter was brought in the New
York Supreme Court. In Callahan v. Carey,50 the plaintiffs, an estimated 10,000
homeless men in New York, filed suit alleging that there was a shortage of shelters
and that the existing shelters were unhealthy and dangerous. The complaint also
4' 42 U.S.C. §11302(a) (1989).
46 Cuomo, supra note 2, at 15.
47 Cal. Gov't Code § 15292(c) (Deering Supp. 1990).
" See generally supra note 2.
49F. Caro, Estimating the Numbers of Homeless Persons in Community Service Society of New York
(1981Xunpublished manuscript), reprinted in CuOMo, supra note 2, at 15.
t' Callahan v. Carey, N.Y. I.1, Dec. 11, 1979, at 10 (Sup. CL N.Y. County Dec. 5, 1979), af'd, 118
A.D.2d 1054,499 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1st Dept 1986).
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alleged that the failure to provide sufficient and adequate shelter violated Article
XVII, section 1 of the New York Constitution which states, "The aid, care and sup-
port of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such
of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may
from time to time determine." (emphasis added)51
After a preliminary injunction was issued requiring state and city officials to
provide shelter," a consent decree was settled which obligated the officials "to pro-
vide shelter and board to each homeless man who applies" if the applicant qualifies
for standard relief, or is in need of temporary shelter because of a mental or physi-
cal disability or social dysfunction.53
Subsequently, the rights of the homeless frequently have been litigated in the
New York courts. In 1982, the right to receive emergency shelter was expanded to
also include homeless women,' and homeless families. In Koster v. Webb,56 the
court found that federal AFDC benefits were available to families if they met the
eligibility standards and if the parent was aware of the benefit availability. Howev-
er, there is no federal duty under the AFDC program to provide housing. Further-
more, it was not mandatory that a state participate in the federal AFDC program.
Therefore, if a state chose to take part in the program, it may also choose whether
to incorporate a provision for emergency housing into its own specific plans.
The Koster court held that the state of New York participated in the AFDC
plan and chose to voluntarily incorporate such a provision for emergency housing.
The court found that in doing so, the state committed itself to provide emergency
family shelter and was bound to perform under its promise.
Four years later, the Court of Appeals of New York held in McCain v. Koch,"
that the Supreme Court had the power to issue a temporary injunction requiring
certain New York City departments to "provide housing which satisfied minimum
standards of sanitation, safety and decency."" These requirements, however, were
only mandated when the City had already undertaken to provide emergency hous-
ing for homeless families. The court refused to "resolve questions pertaining to the
underlying obligation to furnish 'emergency shelter to eligible homeless families
with children.' ,59
District of Columbia
Federal courts also resist addressing the issue of whether a fundamental right to
shelter exists. In Williams v. Bany,6" the District of Columbia decided to close
three of their shelters. The city gave the residents four days notice. The District
"Coates, supra note 1, at 310.
Coates, supra note 1, at 310.
Frances E. Werner, Homelessness: A Litigation Roundup, 18 CLPARiNcHOUSB RBv. 1255,1256 (1985).
Eldridge v. Koch, IndexNo. 41494/82 (N.Y.App.Div. Dec. 13, 1982) (CXAPuNoHousa No. 38,512).
5 See Koster v. Webb, 598 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1983). See also Lamboy v. Gross, 129
Misc.2d 564,493 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1985), affid, 126 A.D.2d 265, 513 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1987) Action
to enforce the right to adequate emergency shelter. The Court granted preliminary injunction to prohibit
sheltering families with children in welfare offices without beds, food or showers.56 598 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1983). Also see generally 42 USC §§602-608, 622 (1989).
17 517 N.Y.S.2d 918, 923 (1987). See also Barnes v. Koch, 136 Misc.2d 96, 518 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct.
1987) cited in Coates, supra note 1, at 310 n.54 ("[R]ight to emergency shelter includes provision of envi-
ronment free of potentially significant health dangers such as lead-based paint, asbestos insulation, and
lack of sprinkler system and of lavatory facilities.. :.
5 McCain v. Koch, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (1987).
5 Id. at 921,922.
60 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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Court for the District of Columbia granted preliminary injunctive relief to plaintiffs
who sought to enjoin the city from terminating shelters which housed homeless
men without giving them procedural due process. The court found that there was a
likelihood that, in providing shelter to the homeless men, the city had created "a
constitutionally cognizable entitlement [to shelter.]" The court relied on Goldberg
v. Kelly which stated that "welfare provides the means to obtain essential food,
clothing, housing, and medical care." (emphasis added.) The court concluded that
government benefits constitute a property interest, and when termination of welfare
benefits "deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live," such
deprivation results in the denial of the recipient's property right.62 Therefore, the
recipient must be afforded procedural due process upon termination of benefits.
The United States Court of Appeals held that notice of the planned closing
with a given opportunity to respond was sufficient procedural due process. Further,
the Williams court stated that confrontation of the issue regarding whether the
City's decision to terminate emergency shelter services was procedurally correct,
"was not ripe for decision by the district court."6 3
The plaintiffs argued that a District of Columbia regulation requiring the D.C.
government to "provide, on a contract basis, temporary shelter and social services
to homeless, unattached adult males"" supported the District Court's finding that
there was a constitutional entitlement to shelter. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the regulation did not provide for specific services, did not give any indication re-
garding the level of support provided to homeless persons and did not guarantee
any certain number of homeless persons would be sheltered. Therefore, the court
concluded, the regulation did not expand the rights of the homeless to receive shel-
ter from the City.6
Two years later, a statutory right to shelter was established in the District of
Columbia when the D.C. Overnight Shelter Initiative became law after being ap-
proved by voters. The summary statement for the initiative stated:
The District of Columbia, in recognition that:
(1) All persons have a right at all times to overnight shelter adequate to
maintain, support and protect human health;
(2) The costs of providing adequate and accessible shelter to all in need
are outweighed by the costs of increased police protection, medical care,
and suffering attending the failure to provide adequate shelter, and
(3) It is in the best interest of the District to provide overnight shelter for
the homeless, hereby establishes in law the right to adequate overnight
shelter, and provides for identification of those in need of shelter and pro-
vision of such shelter. (emphasis added)'
The Overnight Shelter Act further provided judicial relief in the event that the
District of Columbia failed to provide the overnight shelter. If the right to shelter is
denied, the aggrieved person "may sue for relief in any court... [and] the court
61 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1969).
0 Id. at 262.
63 708 F.2d at 792.
D.C. Mun. Regs. it. 6B, § 310.11(c) (1970).
708 F.2d at 792 n.4.
Florence W. Roisman, Establishing a Right to Housing: An Advocate's Guide in HousiNo LAw BuLarN
41, n.8 (May/June 1990).
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may grant such relief as it deems appropriate. Sovereign immunity shall not bar
actions to enforce rights established..."'
The government filed suit seeking to enjoin and invalidate the initiative, stat-
ing that it violated the "laws appropriating funds" exception to citizens' right to
make laws through initiative process. In District of Columbia Board of Elections
and Ethics, et al v. District of Columbia,' the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed the
Superior Court summary judgment in favor of the District. The court upheld the
initiative's validity while disparaging the right to shelter proclaimed by the Act,
stating that "the fact that the initiative may be denominated loosely an entitlement
program," does not make an initiative a law appropriating funds."
The following year, after recognizing that one room highway hotels were not
an adequate means of housing for minor children, the District of Columbia enacted
the Emergency Shelter Services for Families Act. This legislation provided for
emergency shelter units (in an apartment-style atmosphere) for homeless families.
Each unit was required to have, among other things, separate cooking and bath-
room facilities, separate sleeping quarters for adults and minor children and an out-
door area sufficient for exercise and play use by children. The Act further provided
for resource counseling and training centers, and required the City to move families
out of emergency housing and into permanent housing as swiftly as possible. Since
the District of Columbia has failed to comply with this law, litigation is now pend-
* 70ing.
Likewise, suits have been filed to enforce (and explore the boundaries) of the
Overnight Shelter Act. In 1989, preliminary injunction was granted ordering the
District of Columbia to improve family shelters,7' and later that year, a final order
was entered by D.C. Superior Court which increased the number of beds and the
quality of shelter, including clean towels and linens.'
On June 26, 1990, the D.C. City Council enacted a bill to repeal parts of the
Act, including the entitlement provision. A Referendum Committee has announced
that the bill will be suspended until it can be submitted to the voters. On the same
day, the City Council also enacted an "Emergency Act" which, because it was
presented as emergency legislation, was effective immediately. The "Emergency
Act" purports to repeal the entitlement facet of the Overnight Shelter Act. Subse-
quent litigation, including Atchison has challenged the validity of the Emergency
Act.73
West Virginia
The same year the Williams court denied that the homeless had a right to hous-
ing in D.C., the West Virginia Department of Welfare was ordered to provide
emergency shelter to all persons who were unable to obtain shelter on their own. In
Hodge v. Ginsberg,4 six homeless residents of Charleston, West Virginia brought
suit to compel the Welfare Department to provide them with shelter and other basic
needs. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted a writ of manda-
D.C. Code § 3-606, reprinted in Roisman, id. at 41.
520 A.2d 671 (D.C. 1986).
"Id. at 675.
70 Fountain v. Barry, No. 90-CA01503 (D.C., filed Feb. 12, 1990XClearinghouse No. 45,724).
71 Walls v. Barry, No. 1732-88 (D.C. Super. Ct. April 1, 1989) (Clearinghouse No. 43,461).
7 Atchison v. Barry, No. CA-1976-88 (D.C. Super. CL June 27, 1989) (Clearinghouse No. 44,155).
73 See Roisman, supra note 66, at 41-42.
74 303 S.E.2d 245 (W.Va. 1983).
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mus requiring the Department of Welfare to comply with the West Virginia Code75
and the Department's own Social Services Manual76 which provided that incapaci-
tated adults would receive emergency shelter, food and medical care. The court
interpreted the term "incapacitated adults" to include indigents "who, by reason of
the recurring misfortunes of life, are unable to independently carry on the daily ac-
tivities of life necessary to sustaining life and reasonable health,"' and specifically
included persons, such as the plaintiffs, as incapacitated adults.
New Jersey
Unlike the state of New York, a provision to furnish emergency shelter under
its AFDC plan does not automatically guarantee that homeless children will contin-
ue to be sheltered. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that emergency aid to
homeless families with children could be terminated after five months of initial re-
ceipt. In Franklin v. New Jersey Department of Human Services,' eleven mothers
who had been placed in motels for emergency shelter, brought suit when the defen-
dant's regulation placed a five month limitation on the receipt of emergency hous-
ing benefits. They argued that the "arbitrary (i.e. fixed) expiration date for the
program of emergency assistance violate[d] their right to shelter for their dependent
children" as provided under the State AFDC program and the State Constitution. 9
The plaintiffs stated that although they do not want their families to continue
living in a one-room highway hotel, the alternative to that may be no shelter at all.
The court noted the importance of keeping families together and acknowledged that
"all persons, regardless of fault, are entitled to the basic human needs for shelter
and food and it is the obligation of the government to ensure that these needs are
met." The court concluded, however, that the regulation was valid. Believing that
there were other programs in place or other programs soon to be established which
would provide housing, the court found that "the commissioner [of the department]
has not abandoned these children. '
Massachusetts
In 1987, an important event occurred in Massachusetts. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that providing temporary emergency accommodations
for families in motels, hotels and shelters did not satisfy the state's duty to provide
housing under its AFDC program. In Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless, et
al v. Secretary of Human Services, et al. , the court held that the State Welfare De-
partment itself did not have the authority to fix the AFDC standard of need, and
that the department was obligated to advise the legislature when it determined that
the standard of aid that was insufficient to enable an AFDC parent to bring up a
child, according to the level provided for in G.L. c. 118 § 2, "properly in his or her
own home. 82
The Massachusetts Coalition court found that family homelessness in Massa-
chusetts was increasing. It further acknowledged that in 1985, 75% of the home-
less were families and 80% of these families relied on AFDC as their sole source of
71 W. Va. Code § 9-6-1 through 9-6-8.
76 Department of Welfare Social Services Manual, Chapter 29.
77303 S.E.2d at 250 (W.Va. 1983).
- 543 A.2d I (NJ. 1988).
" Id. at 2.
"Id. at 10.
"511 N.RE2d 603 (Mass. 1987).
2 Id. at 614.
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support.' By rejecting the Welfare Department's argument that the Code's provi-
sion "really only meant that the family should be kept together," the Massachusetts
Coalition court acknowledged that there was a statutory right to permanent hous-
ing.
California
A right to shelter simply does not exist in California. The judicial system,
however, is beginning to liberally interpret statutory language in order to provide
"the homeless with only a semblance of the legal rights which most other Ameri-
cans take for granted."" In one such case, Hansen v. Department of Social Ser-
vices,' the result of such broad judicial interpretation was significant because it
caused the legislature to take action to provide relief for homeless AFDC families.
Prior to 1987, the Welfare and Institutions Code § 16500 et seq.' provided
emergency shelter for homeless children. Under § 16504.1, however, the provision
for emergency shelter was interpreted to only provide such shelter to homeless chil-
dren who no longer resided with their parents. Many families, whose sole income
was AFDC, were unable to find housing on the benefit allowance that was given to
them. The parents were often forced to place their children in foster care in order
to provide housing for their children. Believing that foster care would be a tempo-
rary situation until they were able to find housing for their families, the parents
were then notified that they were no longer eligible for AFDC benefits because
their children were no longer living with them. Not only did this result in a loss of
income for the parents, it also contributed to the permanent breakup of families.
In Hansen v. Department of Social Services,'7 a class action suit was brought in
Los Angeles County on behalf of homeless families or families who were threat-
ened with homelessness. The plaintiffs sought to compel the Department of Social
Services (DSS) to provide emergency shelter or other child welfare services to
homelessfamilies in order to keep the families intact.'
DSS argued that § 16504.1 did not require the department to assist homeless
families in securing housing. Furthermore, DSS contended, that destitute, but in-
tact families were not eligible for any sums (beyond their AFDC grant) to help ob-
tain adequate housing. Homeless children were only eligible to receive emergency
shelter if they were removed from their homes. 9
The Hansen court held that § 16504.1 must be "given a broad meaning!" and
affirmed the trial court's order enjoining DSS from excluding homeless children
who still remained with a parent or guardian from receiving emergency shelter.
The court further stated that it was the court's "obligation to ensure that [the Cali-
fornia legislature enactments] be actively and humanely enforced.., with the rea-
sonable understanding of the practical demands of the circumstances with which
individual homeless families are faced."91
'7Id. at 605 n.3.
84 See Coates, supra note 1, at 300.
' 193 Cal.App.3d 283 (1987).
'Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Cal. Welfare & Institutions Code
(Deering 1985).
87 193 Cal.App.3d 283 (1987).
"Id. at 287.
"Id. at 290.
90Id. at 298.
" Id. at 298.
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A few months after Hansen, the California Legislature enacted a new program
which provided special needs allowances designed to assist homeless AFDC fami-
lies find temporary and permanent housing.9 The Welfare & Institutions Code
§ 11450(f) provided that a homeless family would receive homeless assistance when
its members were eligible for AFDC, including $30 a day for up to four weeks in
order to obtain temporary shelter." It also included provisions for permanent hous-
ing assistance, such as payment of the last month rent, the security deposit, and
utility deposits.' Eligibility for temporary and permanent shelter assistance was
limited to once every 12 months.O
As homeless families celebrated their victory, the battle continued to rage.
The County of Los Angeles DSS Director enacted emergency regulations to acti-
vate the statute before its effective date. The emergency regulation would remain
in effect for 120 days. Upon expiration of the emergency regulation, the Director
planned to implement a new revised homeless assistance regulation. Whereas the
emergency regulation considered families who were sharing housing as homeless,
the revised regulation "would have barred any family that was sharing housing with
others from eligibility for the program, even if the family was truly homeless."
In counteraction, several single homeless mothers with children brought suit to
prevent DSS from modifying the emergency regulation in Merriman v. McMahon.'
The purpose of the suit was to prevent DSS from abolishing the homeless assis-
tance program to families who were sharing a dwelling with another family while
trying to obtain their own housing. The Alameda Superior Court enjoined the DSS
from implementing its new program or "any other similarly designed regulation."'
The battle had been won.
Even though AFDC families are guaranteed assistance in obtaining housing,
not all homeless families receive AFDC. Families with both parents in the home
are often ineligible for AFDC benefits. These families, and families that for other
reasons do not receive AFDC, do not have access to emergency shelter. This re-
sults in the breakdown of the family structure, either when one parent leaves the
home in order to allow the family to become eligible for AFDC, or when parents
give their children up in order to provide housing for them. In either case, the re-
sult is tragic.
There is also no right to emergency shelter for single persons, whether or not
they receive General Assistance. In Hodge, the court mandated that shelter must
be provided for all homeless adults in West Virginia, regardless of their eligibility
for benefits. On the other hand, California homeless advocates have had to spend
their time fighting arbitrary barriers to general assistance and in trying to define the
boundaries of legislative discretion which exists in California's relief and support
statute. Recently, however, advocates are beginning to bring cases before the
courts to try to establish a fundamental right to shelter under the state relief and
support statute.
The Welfare & Institutions Code §17000 was adopted by the California legis-
lature in 1901. It provides that "[e]very county and every city and county shall re-
9 See Coates, supra note 1, at 352.
9' §11450(f)(2XA) (Supp. 1991).
§§ 11450(f)(2)(B), 11450(f)(2XC) (Supp. 1991).
§I1450(f)(2)(E) (Supp. 1991).
See Coates, supra note 1, at 352.
"No. 640362-5 (Cal. Alameda Super. CL, June 29, 1988) cited in Coates, supra note 1, at 349.
Coates, supra note 1, at 353.
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lieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated
by age, disease, or accident... when they are not supported by their relatives or
friends, by their own means, or by state hospitals..."
As further designated by § 17001, the standard of aid and care provided for the
indigent is determined by the board of supervisors of each county. Although the
duty of each county and city to support their indigents is mandatory,"ro judicial en-
croachment by the California courts on legislative territory has traditionally been
avoided unless the court finds that the standard administered by the board of super-
visors is arbitrary and capricious.0  The legislature described the scope of § 17000
when it enacted § 10000 which provides, in pertinent part, that,
The purpose of this division is to provide for protection, care and assis-
tance to the people of the state in need thereof, and to promote the welfare
and happiness of all the people of the state by providing appropriate aid
and services to all of its needy and distressed. It is the legislative intent
that aid shall be administered and services provided promptly and humane-
ly, with due regard for the preservation offamily life ... and that aid shall
be so administered and services so provided.., as to encourage self-
respect, self-reliance, and the desire to be a good citizen, useful to society.
(emphasis added)"
Some counties have taken extreme measures to discourage the poor from ap-
plying for relief. In Sacramento County, the county welfare department required
that new applicants, in order to receive GA, move into its Bannon Street Shelter,
"the first poorhouse to be established in the United States for more than half a cen-
tury."" As a result, the county was actually creating homelessness.
In 1983, the California Supreme Court held in Robbins v. Superior Court"0'
that "the county's policy violates the goals of the states' welfare laws as reflected
in § 10000." It concluded that the county's program of placing GA recipients in
the Bannon Street Shelter does not "humanely promote 'self-reliance' or 'self-
respect' when it compels the recipient to "eat, drink, sleep, bathe and socialize ac-
cording to a rigid schedule.... ."1' Additionally, the Robbins court acknowledged
that the requirement to live at the Shelter infringed on the recipients constitutional
right to privacy.'16
While judicial encroachment on the legislative domain is usually avoided, the
Robbins court concluded that "the courts play an important role in assuring that the
provisions of the public welfare laws are liberally interpreted and actively en-
forced.... The courts must enforce the counties' duty.., in a 'humane' manner
consistent with modem standards.""lsc
" Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 17000 (Deering 1985).
"'See Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 CaL.App.3d 494, 501, 223 CaL.Rptr. 716 (1986) (The county must set
GA standards of aid and care that provide benefits necessary for basic survival). See also Mooney v.
Pickett, 4 Cal.3d 669, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231 (1971XCounty aid cannot be denied to applicant
on the sole ground he is employable).
'City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. App. 3d 44; 128 Cal.Rptr. 712 (1976).
'Cal. Weif. & Inst. Code § 10000 (Deering 1985).
IiSAckAEmro B.E, July 1, 1983, at 1.
'38 Cal.3d 199,211 Cal.Rptr. 398, 695 P.2d 695 (1983).
'038 Cal.3d at 209.
10638 Cal.3d at 215-16.
'38 Cal.3d at 208-10.
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Thus when the courts find the standard of care set by the county to be clearly
arbitrary and capricious, they are willing to order that the standard be changed or
substantiated. In Mooney v. Pickett,"o the Supreme Court of California acknowl-
edged that § 17001 conferred broad discretion on the county to determine eligibil-
ity standards, the type and amount of relief available and any condition attached to
the receipt thereof. However, the court further held that "this discretion may be
exercised only within fixed boundaries."'"
The fixed boundaries created by Mooney were expanded by the appellate court
in City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court. 11 In City and County of
San Francisco,"' plaintiffs established that the maximum monthly grant under the
city's general assistance program was $83 for men and $88 for women. This
amount was substantially lower than the GA grants of neighboring counties. The
court held that a county must make a determination of facts necessary to establish
subsistence standards within the county. It concluded that "the fixing of a level of
aid so far below what is necessary to survive to persons who have no other means
by which to live is arbitrary and capricious and not consistent with the objective
and purposes of the law ... set forth in section 10000." Furthermore, the court
flatly rejected the city's argument that it "had made a 'colorable' effort to provide
relief for its indigent....2
Two successive cases brought by the indigent residents of Merced County es-
tablished that the county must substantiate its grants of assistance with a factual
study which includes all of the basic needs for survival. In Boehm v. County of
Merced (Boehm I), the county based its grant amounts on a recommendation
from the Merced County Department of Human Resources. The appellate court
held that the county was required to conduct a study beyond just the recommenda-
tions of another county department. Following City and County of San Francisco,
the court found that a survey or study would satisfy the county's duty to determine
the needs of its indigents. Therefore, it held that the board of supervisors had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in reducing the amount of its GA benefits without con-
ducting such a prior study."4
The following year, in Boehm v. Superior Court (Boehm l), 5 plaintiffs
brought suit when the county reduced GA benefits based on a study as to the reci-
pients' needs for food, housing and utilities alone. The appellate court held that
since §§ 10000, 11000, 17000 and 17001 required the county to provide GA recipi-
ents with an appropriate allowance for each of the basic necessities of life, the
county had violated its mandatory duty under § 17000. The court stated that "mini-
mum subsistence, at the very least, must include allocation for housing, food, utili-
ties, clothing, transportation and medical care." (emphasis added)"6
The requirements set out by Boehm I and Boehm II, however, do not allow the
court to consider if the county's grants actually meet minimum subsistence needs.
Instead, factual inquiry is limited to whether the board of supervisors considered
104 CaI.3d 669,94 Cal.Rptr. 279,483 P.2d 1231 (1971).
' 4 Ca.3d at 679.
1057 Cal.App.3d 44, 128 Cal.Rptr. 712 (1976).
...57 Cal.App.3d at 49.
11257 Cal.App.3d at 48.
1163 CaL.App.3d 447,209 Cal.Rptr. 530 (1985).
114163 Cal.App.3d at 453.
..178 Cal.App.3d 494,223 Cal.Rptr. 716 (1986).
"6178 Cal.App.3d at 501.
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the factors of subsistence mandated by § 17000 and whether there is an evidentiary
predicate on which the grant levels were set. In Poverty Resistance Center v.
Hart,17 the court concluded that "absent allegations of impropriety in the conduct
of Board proceedings, or in the provision of information to the Board, judicial re-
view is limited to the record of the proceedings before the board.." The plaintiffs
appealed after the trial court sustained the county's demurrer, contending that the
amount allocated by the county for the cost of shelter was not supported by any of
the county's studies or surveys.""
The county, on the other hand, claimed that the discrepancy was justified by
the cost of living surveys which "represent[ed] hypothetical rather than real data..
. [of] actual costs incurred by GA recipients." The appellate court responded to the
county's claim, stating that "[the required survey] is not a charade. Persons cannot
eat hypothetical food nor live in hypothetical houses."'20 It further held that the al-
lowances adopted by the county for housing and utilities were not reasonably sup-
ported by evidence, and therefore, plaintiffs presented an actionable claim for relief
for improper standards of aid and care under § 17001.
The appellate court concluded in Poverty Resistance Center that the plaintiffs
were entitled to judicial relief if the board of supervisors exceeded the boundary of
discretion it is allowed under § 17001. It further ruled that once those boundaries
were shattered, the adequacy of the assessments become a question of law for the
court. 121 The court, however, limited its ability to review the board's decision to
only those assessments pertaining to the core elements of survival. Therefore, the
court declined to address the adequacy of other needs which it felt were not essen-
tial to subsistence, such as unprescribed medicines, use of laundry facilities, barber
services, telephone services and newspapers.'
The Poverty Resistance court also concluded that "the county is not con-
strained to make an individual needs assessment for each recipient" when deter-
mining the monthly flat grant. The court allowed that the county may average the
costs in making a needs assessment as long as it is done fairly."
The issue of fair averaging later surfaced when Yolo County relied on a defec-
tive study in determining its assessment of GA needs. In Guidotti v. County of
Yolo, 1'2 the court held that the board did not satisfy the statutory and case law re-
quirements that there be evidentiary support for the board's assessment of needs for
GA benefits. In Guidotti, plaintiffs filed a class action suit questioning the stan-
dards of the county's GA relief benefits. The trial court, finding that the benefits
were inadequate and that the county had failed to investigate the subsistence needs
of GA recipients, ordered the county to complete a study immediately.
The county conducted the study and thereafter adopted new standards. Reap-
pearing in court, the county moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs opposed
the motion, stating that there was a factual issue concerning the adequacy of the
housing allowance in the new study. The trial court, however, granted the summa-
ryjudgment.
"7213 Cal.App.3d 295,261 Cal.Rptr. 545 (1989).
"'261 CaI.Rptr. at 549.
"'261 Ca.Rptr. at 552.
12261 CaI.Rptr. at 552.
121261 CaI.Rptr. at 551.
"m261 Cal.Rptr. at 554.
123261 CaI.Rptr. at 553-54.
'2214 Cal.App.3d 1552,263 Cal.Rptr. 262 (1989).
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The appellate court reversed and held that evidence did not support the coun-
ty's determination that the appropriate housing allowance for the county's GA re-
cipients was $121 per month. The court found that only 183 GA recipients were
surveyed by the county, and 39 of those received subsidized housing or substandard
housing. Furthermore, 61.7% of those surveyed shared housing, and some of the
recipients surveyed were young adults who lived with their parents and presumably
paid "token rent." Still others, the court found, paid as little as $20 for monthly
rent. Thus, the court held that the study was flawed in that it averaged disparate
groups to determine the market value of minimal subsistence housing. The court
held that averaging, while in itself not an unreliable basis for setting grant levels,
"must be fair and it must be reasonable."'12
In Guidotti, the county's study made no suggestion that any housing was avail-
able for $121 per month. In response, the county emphasized that "the level of GA
assistance is measured not by pleasure, generosity or even what is minimally ac-
ceptable to the average person but what is necessary to survive or basic survival."
The court replied that a person could survive by sleeping on a riverbank, or in a
car, or even on the side of the road. But that, the court concluded, can hardly be
considered habitable housing." The court in Poverty Resistance further criticized
the possibility that emergency shelter could be considered "home" for GA recipi-
ents. The court stated that "the homeless shelters, at best, supplant a monthly grant
for some recipients, but afford nothing to those recipients who do not and cannot
patronize them."'
127
The assumption that the homeless can meet all of their basic needs on general
assistance is patently absurd. Furthermore, many single homeless people do not
receive GA benefits. In addition to those who are not willing to accept public as-
sistance, numerous others are uninformed of the availability of benefits or are inca-
pable of completing the bureaucratic process one must survive to receive the
grants. Still others are automatically ineligible due to "arbitrary pre-conditions,
such as a lack of identification and/or address.' ' "
Three cases filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court have gleaned favorable
results for the homeless. They began in 1984 when there were an estimated 30,000
homeless people domiciled in the County of Los Angeles. The only shelters avail-
able were private shelters which were limited to 500 beds. Los Angeles County did
not fund any additional public shelters; instead, it followed a procedure in which
the first people to apply for shelter were referred to voucher hotels. Voucher hotels
provided rooms in return for deferred payment from the county. Because there was
a limited number of voucher hotels available, rooms did not remain vacant past
mid-morning. The remaining applicants would be issued a check for $8.00 and re-
turned to the street to find a hotel which offered an $8.00 rate. A survey reported
that there were only seven hotels which would accept the county's $8.00 check and
many times, it was out of reach of the recipient's means of transportation."
The plaintiffs filed a complaint that this system, which provided the only form
of emergency assistance to homeless persons, was inadequate. In Ross v. Board of
Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles,' the court entered preliminary injunc-
"'263 Cal.Rptr. at 270.
"2263 Cal.Rptr. at 269, n.12.
1 7261 Cal.Rptr. at 552.
'2ee Coates, supra note 1, at 313.
"2See Werner, supra note 53, at 1258.
'
3 Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. filed June 11,1984 (Clearinghouse No. 37,590).
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tion prohibiting the county from issuing the $8 checks unless there was a sufficient
number of hotel rooms available for that price. This resulted in the abandonment
of the check system. In its place, the county doubled the voucher hotel program to
provide more emergency housing for the homeless.
The year before the Ross injunction, a suit had been brought challenging not
the form of emergency shelter relief, but the procedure that the homeless person
had to go through in order to receive her $8.00 check.33 The complaint stated that
the county did not immediately provide emergency shelter when requested. Usual-
ly, a homeless person would have to wait at least a week for an appointment to re-
ceive relief. Once present at the appointment, the complaint alleged, the homeless
person was often denied emergency shelter because she could not produce formal
proof of identification. Failure to produce identification is not uncommon among
the homeless because they are often robbed or frequently lose their belongings.
The court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the county from barring
relief to homeless persons who could not produce identification. The terms of the
TRO was incorporated into the settlement submitted to the court and "within two
weeks, the hotels were filled."'
32
The voucher hotels, however, were uninhabitable. There were frequent break-
ins because of the broken windows and unsecured rooms. The rooms were soiled
and infested with vermin. As a result, attorneys with Legal Aid Foundation of Los
Angeles (LAFLA) filed Paris v. Board of Supervisors3 3 because, according to LA-
FLA attorney Gary Blasi, "living in the park was better than living in voucher ho-
tels."' In the end, the county negotiated a settlement in which the hotel standards
were improved.
Homeless advocates have also challenged San Diego County's regulation ter-
minating GA payments to any recipient who did not obtain a valid address in 60
days. In Nelson v. Board of Supervisors of San Diego County, 35 the court held that
the regulation requiring an address violated the county's mandatory duty under §
17000. In addition, the Nelson court found that plaintiffs had a sufficient claim that
the regulation unconstitutionally discriminated against those county residents with-
out valid addresses.'36 The court, however, did not address the merits of the con-
stitutional claim.
Recently, however, Cal. Court of Appeals, First District, struck down plain-
tiff's assertion that there is a fundamental right to shelter when it upheld the con-
stitutionality of a San Francisco ordinance that prevented people from sleeping
overnight in their vehicles on public streets. In Vehicular Residents Association v.
Agnos, 37 the plaintiffs charged that the ordinance denied equal protection to poor
people who had nowhere to live except in their cars. The court declared that the
ordinance did not discriminate between the poor and the non-poor in that the ordi-
nance also prohibited the non-poor from inhabiting motor homes between the hours
of 10 p.m. and 6 aim.
"'See Eisenheim v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles, No. C-479453 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. filed Dec. 19, 1983) (Clearinghouse No. 38,508).
"2Gregory Goldin, Gimme Shelter, in CALFORNIA LAWYER 31 (May 1987). (Interview with Gary L Blasi,
attorney with Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles).
'"LA. Super CL, No. C-523-361 cited in Goldin, id. at 32.
"id. n.133 at 32 & 34.
135190 Cal.App.3d 25,235 Cal.Rptr. 305 (1987).
u190 Cal.App.3d at 35.
u7222 CalApp.3d 996,272 Cal.Rptr. 216 (1990).
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According to the L.A. Daily Journal,138 the Deputy City Attorney believed that
"'the court's decision is correct.' He further questioned whether there actually
were any San Franciscans living out of their cars as a matter of economic necessi-
ty."p
(A Lack o) Conclusion.
People without homes have always been regarded by our society as second-
class citizens. They are often dirty and unkempt and dressed rather strangely;
sometimes extending palms out for money or sometimes mumbling to somebody
that nobody else can see. The general public scurries by them, wrapped in warm
coats, trying to ignore them, hoping they will go away. But they can't go away, for
there is no place to go.
Is there a fundamental right to shelter? Homeless advocates across our nation
envision such a right and are slowly establishing that perhaps the right to shelter
indeed exists. It has taken much time to lay the foundation and it will take even
more time to support the structure. Meanwhile, millions of people live on our
streets, hungry and cold.
Frequent litigation to establish or improve emergency housing has, for the
most part, been successful. Homeless advocates in California have challenged the
levels of benefits and the habitability of shelters made available by counties
throughout the state. While acknowledging that housing is a basic necessity of life,
the courts still refuse to consider whether a right to either permanent or temporary
housing exists.
Across the nation, the D.C. Emergency Shelter Services for Families Act and
the Massachusetts Coalition court ruling are both unique and promising in the fight
for shelter. Although enforcement of such legislative acts and judicial decisions is
frustrating, they establish the necessity for children to be raised by their own fami-
lies in permanent and adequate housing situations. In short, they confirm that an
emergency shelter is just not a home.
In New York, the courts will usually issue mandatory injunctions when the
public entity has obligated itself to provide relief and then, failed to perform. Fur-
thermore, an injunction may be granted when the entity has declined to comply
with a statutory duty, or has clearly abused its discretion under a statutory duty.
Like her sister states, however, the New York courts continually refuse to address
the issue of whether there is a fundamental right to shelter under the State Constitu-
tion. Therefore, an 'abstract right to shelter' becomes difficult and time-consuming
to enforce and the needs of the poor continually remain unmet.'39
Is there enough time? Advocates not only have to establish the right to shelter
but they also have to confront the reasons behind homelessness. Increased housing
allotments are not going to mean anything if there are not enough low-income
homes being built to house our people, or enough jobs being created to employ our
workers, or enough medical care being provided to help our mentally and physical-
ly disabled. Advocates must deal with these issues in addition to confronting the
immediate right to shelter for our homeless today. Is there enough time?
We can no longer depend on our legislatures. Our cities, counties and states
across the nation seem to be more concerned with avoiding the dilemma surround-
.L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Aug. 8, 1990, p. 4 .
"'See Coates, supra note 1, at 310-11.
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ing the homeless than curing the problem. The only avenue available is litigation
- slowly building the right to shelter, slowly defining legislative boundaries, slow-
ly enforcing court mandates on cities and counties. Through litigation, advocates
can bring to the public attention the plight of the homeless and work to change the
common misconceptions surrounding these people without homes.
Through litigation, we can educate our public and our judges that the homeless
are not second-class citizens but that they are people and families who have needs,
just as we do, for enough food and for adequate housing. Through litigation, we
can teach our nation that our homeless are our own.

